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Abstract

The IMF and the World Bank began to attach structural
adjustment restrictions to many of their loans to developing
countries in the early 1980s.

Some of these restrictions are

not based on solid economic ground and are, in many cases not
effective in improving the economic standing of the countries
that receive loans.

In addition, there was also a

misdiagnosis of the problems that occurred in the
underdeveloped countries of the world.

Under the IMF/World

Bank paradigm, the difficulties that most underdeveloped
countries experienced were due to internal distortions and
non-effective development strategies.

Evidence to the

contrary shows that many of the problems that these
underdeveloped nations experienced in the 1970s and early
1980s were mainly exogenous and out of the control of the
individual countries, such as:

Two severe oil shocks, a

world wide recession, and increased real interest rates.
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1:
and
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Imposed by the World Bank and the
International

Monetary

Fund

Introduction
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
otherwise known as the world Bank (WB or the Bank) emerged
out of the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944.

The stated

intent was to help foster more economic "openness" around the
world.

The IMF's policy was to loan nations (mostly war

ravaged European nations after World War II) money to assist
with balance-of-payments difficulties and interest owed to
other banks for previous loans (George and Sebelli, 1994, p.
10).

The World Bank was mainly concerned with providing

loans for specific development projects, and with the
reconstruction of Europe and Japan
Soon after its inception, the World Bank quickly became
the largest supplier of infrastructure to the underdeveloped
world (George and Sebelli, 1994, p. 2).

However, in later

years, critics have seen flaws in their policies.

The Bank's

policies have dislocated entire conununities, destroyed large
sections of forests, turned grasslands to desert, and
transferred land and wealth to the hands of a few rich
farmers and entrepreneurs -- all in the name of development
(George and Sebelli, p. 2).
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When the world Bank first arrived on the international
scene, the focus for loans was to help borrowing countries
with specific difficulties in their infrastructure.

Between

the years of 1961 and 1965, 76.8% of all WB loans were for
electric power or for transportation, and only 6% of these
loans were for agricultural development projects (Ayers,
1983, p. 2).

This focus later changed to projects that

placed emphasis on the natural resources of the economy.

In

many countries the emphasis was on agriculture production and
export.

In countries like Mexico, the emphasis was on fossil

fuels such as oil.
When Robert McNamara became President of the World Bank,
he began a move toward agricultural investment.

He saw that

agricultural investment for exports was the way for these
countries to get their people out of poverty (Ayers, 1983, p.
2).

However, in many cases the end effect was that the

agricultural workers/owners he "intended" to help were
devastated.

This was in part due to IMF/WB recommended

policy changes and because of exogenous economic factors that
caused agricultural prices to bottom out.
Over the years, restrictions attached to the loans have
also changed.

In the early stages, loans were given with few

restrictions.

They were mainly concerned with the country's

debt service ratio.

This was the ratio of a country's

interest and amortization payments on its' public and
publicly guaranteed debt to the country's earnings from
exports of goods and services (Ayers, 1983, p. 3).

Beginning

L
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in the late 1970s and early 1980s, most loans were given with
conditions.

In exchange for the money (which they still had

to repay with interest) the borrowing countries would agree
to certain stipulations, which would move their economies to
be more open and "market friendly."
It was (and still is) the belief that if these economies
were forced to adhere to these new IMF/WB economic standards
that they would foster growth and push these countries
further up the development hill.

In my opinion, the IMF and

the World Bank have not succeeded in their tasks in many
areas of the world.

Also, in many cases, the negative

externalities associated with IMF/WB policies have exceeded
the supposed gain.
The 1991 World Development Report defines economic
development as, nA sustainable increase in living standards
that encompasses material consumption, education, health, and
environmental protection" (World Bank, 1991, p. 31).

The

publishers of the WDR, namely the World Bank, believe that
countries who achieve rapid and successful development
exhibit two characteristics:

They invest in the education of

men and women, i.e. human capital;

and from these human

capital investments the country achieves a high level of
productivity by giving leading roles to markets, competition,
and foreign trade (Fanelli, Frenkel, and Taylor, 1992, p. 1).
Theoretically, these general beliefs are then molded into
policy provisions.

However it is ironic, given the 1991

WDR's definition of development, that in many cases the
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IMF/WB policies actually force the project countries to cut
back on human capital investments rather than to embrace it
as a necessity for development.
At the outset of their creation, the roles of the IMF
and the World Bank were quite different.

The function of the

International Monetary Fund was to extend short-term balanceof-payments support to countries experiencing temporary
payment difficulties (Payer, 1982, p. 103).

The world Bank,

on the other hand, was supposed to lend funds for economic
development (Payer, p. 109).

The WB would lend funds for

specific development projects such as transportation
improvements or new electrical power facilities (Payer,
p. 109).

Although their missions were different, the two

institutions sometimes worked hand in hand.
Over the years the provisions associated with receiving
IMF loans changed.

They (IMF/WB) began to insist on

increasing levels of economic restructuring.

Around 1980,

the IMF began to issue loans with a specific package of
economic "improvements."

Table 1.1 gives a good

representation of the economic policies the IMF/WB insisted
on.
In recent years the relationship between these
institutions has been solidifying and their loan processes
have become more aligned.

The world Bank began making loans

which held to the standards of the new IMF restructuring
policies.

These new (late 1970s and early 1980s) World Bank

loans were called "non-project" loans (Payer, 1982, p. 109).
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This newly introduced cooperation intensified in 1988 when
the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) was created (Bello,
1994, p. 30).

This organization was set up to oversee the

economic policies set in place by the IMF/WB's technocrats
(Bello, p. 30).

The unification of the IMF and the world Bank treatments
came to be known to its patients as "shock therapy" or
the simultaneous application of short term stabilization
measures and more long-term structural reforms.

It was

not without reason that adjusting countries came to
label the two institutions with derision as the "Bretton
Woods Twins"

(Bello, p. 30).

In addition to the loan conditions listed in Table 1.1,
the country had to agree to stringent monitoring by the Bank
and/or the IMF in order to ensure the country met the agreed
upon targets (Bello, 1994, p. 27).

These targets were

specific figures that the IMF/WB wanted the country to reach
by "improvements" in specific areas of the economy.

Namely,

the current account balances, fiscal balances, trade
balances, and monetary balances.
After agreements were reached, the payments could begin.
However, the disbursements of the loans were made in
increments.

If the country would fail to meet the "targets"

or fail to cooperate in the reform procedures, then the
IMF/WB could hold back payments or refrain from issuing any
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further loans.

Because these reforms covered such a broad

economic area and were so radically different (relative to
the previous economic policies), these loans essentially
meant that they were turning over control of the entire
economy to the IMF/WB (Bello, p. 27).

Table 1.1
Typical Conditionally for IMF/WB Loans
Area of Reform
Fiscal Policy

Suggested Reform
* the country must reduce
fiscal deficits by decreasing
government expenditures (in
practice this means cutting
spending in: health, education
and welfare)
* lift export restrictions

Trade Policy

* institute incentives for
danestic export industries
* liberalize quantitative
import restrictions and cut
import tariffs
Monetary Policy

* devalue danestic currency
(relative to hard currencies)
* :improve regulatory framework
(i.e. deregulate industry)

WB/IMF's Rationale for
the Reform
* this refollll would reduce
inflation and reduce the
demand for capital inflows
fran abroad
* encourages exports, helps to
improve trade imbalances and
seen as a good source of
qrowth
* encourages exports, helps to
improve trade imbalances and
seen as a good source of
qrowth
* strengthen the
canpetitiveness of danestic
industries as well as :improve
industrv efficiency
* promotes export oriented
strategy (i.e. : makes exports
more affordable/canpetitivel
* :improves confidence in the
system

Financial Sector

Industrial sector

Agricultural Policy

Note.

* relax interest rate ceilings
(allow/pressure interest rates
to rise) and reserve
reauirements
* eliminate restrictions on
foreiqn investment in industry
and financial services
* remove Drice controls
* derequlate agricultural
trade and lift any price
controls

* provides incentives for
efficient use of resources
* makes danestic production
and business activity more
efficient due to the presence
of foreiqn canpetition
* ImDroves resource allocation
* help the agricultural sector
becane more efficient and to
encouracre exnorts

From Bello, 1994, p. 27 and Reed, 1992, p. 27.
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The overall intent of these structural reforms was to
make the economy more internationally "market friendly."

The

1991 World Development Report, entitled "The Challenge of

Development", cites several studies including those by
Bhagwati (1978) and Kruger (1978) to demonstrate that freemarket ("non-distorted") economies are the best environments
for fostering a desirable level of development (Fanelli et
al., 1992, p. 1).
However, Fanelli, Frenkel, and Taylor have countered
that the 1991 World Development Report's (i.e. the World
Bank's) argument for their policies has "both loose ends and
missing information" (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 2).

An

example of this would be, blaming the underdeveloped
countries for their severe debt accumulation on governmental
inefficiencies and ineffective government policies, while
ignoring the international conditions effect on these
economies.

The World Bank conducted research with hopes of

explaining the causes behind the developing countries'
difficulties in the mid to late 1970s.

They conducted an

analysis of sixty-eight developing countries, and they
analyzed the impact of labor and capital on the level of
output.

Since the sum of the contributions of those two factors
of productivity (labor and capital) fails to account for
overall growth, the residual or "total factor

L_

Stabilization and S.A. 12
productivity" (TFP) growth is identified with the
efficiency of using inputs - in standard neoclassical
fashion.

The WDR (World Development Report) tries to

explain variations in residual "efficiency" in terms of
the market friendliness of economic policy (Fanelli et
al., 1992, p. 2).

The 1991 WDR also singles out other factors for
determining growth, and the first and most important of these
is education.

The WDR statement that the returns from

education are high is largely indisputable (World Bank, 1991,
p. 43).

The second factor is the domestic policy adopted.
Specifically, the WB believes that a strategy of importsubstituting industrialization (ISI) is detrimental to long
run development.

ISI strategies according to the World Bank

have, for the most part, experienced disappointing results
because, among other factors, protected industries have
failed to mature and the anti-export bias from protection has
impeded growth in exports especially in the area of
agriculture (World Bank, 1991, p. 42).

Fanelli et al. found

in the 1991 WDR (p. 45) that, "A strategy of importsubstituting industrialization may artificially increase
investment at the outset but may have grave long-term costs
in terms of low efficiency and slow technical progress, i.e.
low productivity growth" (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 2).
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In many cases this philosophy fails to hold much weight.
As I will discuss in Chapter 3, countries like Mexico
experienced their best rates of growth under ISI strategies.
In the ISI years from 1965 through 1980, the country
experienced an average growth rate of 6.5% per year (World
Bank figures from the 1988 WDR).

Mexico has failed to come

close to those figures since then.
The third suggested WB factor necessary to obtain growth
and high productivity is external openness (Fanelli et al.,
1992, p. 2).

The fourth WB factor is that economic

instability diminishes the return of investment and growth of
output (World Bank, 1991, p. 42).
The WB's fifth growth contributing factor is one I have
great difficulty in rationalizing or accepting.

According to

the WB, "external factors such as changes in terms of trade,
growth of OECD economies, international interest rates, and
capital flows are asserted not to account for differences in
the performance of individual countries" (Fanelli et al,
1992, p. 2).

Although the 1991 WDR does not provide much

supporting evidence for this claim (see the effects of
external factors page 46-47 in the 1991 WDR), it does however
cite one case study.

They cite a bank sponsored research

project by Mitra et al. (1991) which found no statistical
association between exogenous factors, such as those
mentioned above, and the level of output (World Bank, 1991,
p. 42).

However, as will be shown in Chapter 2, there is

overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
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The 1991 WDR compares the 1960-1973 and the 1973-1987
periods.

They argue that slower output growth almost

everywhere after 1973 was due to a lower residual, or a less
friendly atmosphere for investment (World Bank, 1991, p. 43 &
45).

As I will argue later in this paper, this view that the

problems that the Third World experienced in the 1970s were
caused by their own "unfriendly markets" or by inefficiency
in production, is flawed.

Exogenous factors such as the

Third World debt crisis, two oil price shocks, and two world
wide recessions had a detrimental effect on the Third World
economies and have been major factors in their difficulties.

Stabilization Procedures
The IMF/WB loans came with two sets of conditions:
Policies intended to bring about economic stabilization, and
policies which insist on significant economic structural
changes.

The stabilization policies focus on cutting the

inflation rate and the trade deficit by restricting aggregate
demand through cutting governmental expenditures, and through
monetary restrictions (Taylor, 1994, p. 40-41).

Without fundamental changes in international credit
conditions there is still a risk that IMF-inspired
adjustment policies will drive their recipients toward
prolonged "stabilized stagnation," because these
policies ignore crucial macroeconomic factors such as
linked foreign exchange and fiscal constraints,
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financial fragility, and the dynamics of the inflation
process (Fanelli et al., p. 15).

For example, the IMF/WB paradigm operates on the
assumption that increases in prices are caused by increases
in the money supply.

If the price increases are caused by

supply rigidities, then tightening the money supply is the
wrong prescription.
The 1991 WDR states on page 8 that when government
spending has gone too far (excessive years of fiscal
deficits), the result is excessive borrowing, overvaluation
of the currency, a high level of inflation, and a loss of
export competitiveness (World Bank, 1991, p. 8).

This view

follows the logic that fiscal equilibrium is sufficient and
necessary to bring about stabilization.

Following this path

can be very dangerous, "because it ignores structural
features linking the saving, external and fiscal gaps and
thereby understates the complexity of stabilization,
especially if stagnation is to be avoided" (Fanelli et al.,
1992, p. 15).
The second feature of the stabilization process is
monetary policy "reform."

Over the last fifteen to twenty

years, unsustainable current account positions, governmental
instability, financial crashes, capital flight, and high
levels of inflation or hyper-inflation (particularly Latin
America) have been the salient features of economic
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instability in the underdeveloped world (Fanelli, et al.,
1992, p. 16).
The 1991 WDR does acknowledge that these difficulties
can be part of the economic problems of the underdeveloped
world, in the short run, but there is little discussed about
it.

The long-term effects of these difficulties are not

recognized (see 1991 WDR p. 44-45).
Despite the acknowledgment that these problems can have
detrimental short-run effects on the economy, a major reform
is the devaluation of the domestic currency relative to hard
currencies.

This generally has the obvious economic effects:

Imports become more expensive and therefore citizens can not
afford what they once did (e.g.:

U.S. exports to Mexico have

fallen in 1994-95 due to devaluation's of the Peso);
become cheaper;

exports

anyone (primarily the low income sectors)

who holds domestic currency (as opposed to capital or hard
currencies) has less buying value now and cannot afford to
buy as much food/commodities as they once did, let alone save
anything.
The third stabilization procedure is an effort to bring
about anti-inflationary policies.

The WB places a high

priority on this (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 17).
Fanelli, Frenkel and Taylor lay out five general methods
of reducing inflation on p. 17-18.

(~)

Relative prices can be manipulated. e.g.:

the

exchange rate can be allowed to appreciate in real terms
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or the real wage to fall (by allowing the nominal
exchange rate or wage to rise less rapidly than a
general index of prices).
(~)

Imports can be increased to ease local supply

bottlenecks.

Often, purchases abroad must be financed

by the central bank as it spends reserves to support an
exchange rate pegged as a price anchor.
(~)

Income policies and other forms of market

intervention can be deployed to muff le the most
conflicting social claims.

The most obvious is the

"social pact" to reduce wage inflation while holding
profit claims in line.
(Q)

In a more extreme case, a price freeze plus

contract deindexation - "heterodox shock" in the jargon
- can be attempted as a policy surprise.
(~)

Austerity can be applied, i.e.: a cut in the

government expenditures coupled with the monetary
restriction based on increased interest rates and credit
restraint.

As seen in Table 1.1, the IMF/WB usually leans toward
the austerity approach (cut government expenditures,
devaluation, and increase domestic interest rates).
Obviously each one the above five techniques is unique, just
as each one of the Third World countries is unique.

I find

it far fetched to believe that the austerity approach is the
only effective approach.

Perhaps it would be more prudent to
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examine each country individually and to then determine the
best course for action.

As noted by Lance Taylor, austerity

is more effective in economies in which prices are freef loating, which does not describe many of the Third World
countries in question (Taylor, 1994, p. 58).
In actual practice, the IMF combines austerity with real
wage cuts and reductions in income support programs and
subsidies (for the poor and needy) (Taylor, 1994, p. 58).
The end result is a reduction in demand (partly due to laid
off workers), output contraction, and a lower trade deficit
(due to the decrease in imports because the people can no
longer afford them due to the devaluation of the currency and
because of their lower income) all in the name of inflation
fighting (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 18).
It is not just the fiscal restraint approach that can
harm individuals.

The real problem exists when policies such

as austerity are combined with domestic currency devaluation,
efforts to raise interest rates, and the elimination of
income support programs.
disproportionately.

This hits the poor

First with respect to the devaluation,

since low-income sectors generally hold much of their wealth
in cash (domestic currency), their "nest egg" is now not
worth what it used to be.

Then the government is forced to

cut expenditures including food assistance programs, health
assistance programs, and small business (like small farmers)
assistance.

Then interest rates are pushed up, which
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discourages the poor from applying for loans for a small
business or to buy a tractor (a technological improvement).
As an example, the implementation of austerity programs
in Latin America has resulted in reduced levels of earnings
for the working class.

Between 1980 and 1985, the average

per capita income in 23 Latin American countries fell 9%
while austerity were implemented (this was also due to the
world recession from 1980-82) (Hakkert & Goza, 1989, p. 74).
On an individual country basis other workers have been
devastated.

In Costa Rica, during the implementation of an

austerity program, real wages fell 40% between 1979 and 1982.
Exchange rate policy is the fourth procedure necessary,
according to the IMF/WB philosophy for economic
stabilization.

The 1991 WDR states that it is necessary to

maintain a competitive exchange rate, in order to close the
external gap (balance of payment difficulty) and this
involves an early devaluation (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 18).
The costs associated with importing goods have now gone up
because of the "weaker" domestic currency.
"Problems arise in coordinating devaluation with other
policies, in both stabilization and adjustment contexts"
(Taylor, 1994, p. 59).

If this process of devaluation is

combined with a expansionary policy, it could be very
beneficial for the economy (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 19).
But this is not the case under the IMF/WB paradigm.

As shown

in Table 1.1, a key element to the program is that government
budgets must be slashed for the benefit of a balanced budget.
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When contractionary fiscal policy is combined with currency
devaluation the outcome can be devastating.

When devaluation is added to this policy of monetary and
fiscal austerity to promote exports and earn foreign
exchange, it escalates the contractionary effects by
raising the local cost of imported capital and
intermediate goods, leading to the policy "overkill" for
which the IMF is justly famous (or infamous] (Bello,
1994, p. 36).

This economic contraction scares off private domestic
investment and if left to itself, the economy usually does
not provide signals to renew investor confidence in the
economy (Bello, p. 36).
The 1991 WDR defines stabilization procedures as methods
that "work mainly on the demand side to reduce inflation and
external deficits," while "structural policies are concerned
with the supply side;

they address the efficiency of

resource use, the emphasizing of reforms in specific sectors
-- especially trade, finance, and industry" (World Bank,
1991, p. 113).

Structural Change
Liberalization of trade is one of the IMF/WB's
priorities in their structural reform procedures.

The IMF/WB

believe that the "free market" approach is absolutely

L_
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necessary in order to solve the problems of underdeveloped
"distorted" economies.

Others feel that trade liberalization

should be a less important procedure, or not a procedure at
all, in order to bring about growth and prosperity to these
underdeveloped countries.

"Trade policy orientation, while

important, may not be a dominant determinant of growth and
may not therefore deserve the attention the World Bank and
others have given it" (Hellinger, 1990, p. 884).
Walden Bello echoes these arguments; he also argues that
trade liberalization does not spark investment and growth.
He uses the example of the agricultural sector.

The IMF/WB

philosophy focuses on lifting price controls on commodities
and ignores the more important deep rooted problems such as:
structural, technological, and infrastructural deficiencies
that must be addressed in order to increase efficiency and
productivity (Bello, 1994, p. 36).

The difficulties are

usually addressed by way of state-supported programs, which
are being slashed in order to bring about fiscal equilibrium
(Bello, 1994, p. 36).

Bello cites cases in Africa in which

the WB, through their deregulatory policies, allows the free
market to determine the price for fertilizers.

In many cases

this led to reduced applications, lower yields, and lower
agricultural investment because of the absence of statesupported credit systems (Bello, p. 36).
Why has the IMF/WB placed such a high priority on the
removal of any "market distorting" trade policies?

Fanelli,

Frenkel and Taylor (1992) seem to feel that the IMF/WB

L
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rationale is based on textbook theories.

The World Bank uses

the example of a country that has been under long-term IS!
strategy.

This country usually exhibits a high and

complicated tariff structure and/or strict import quotas
(Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 21).

Most economists feel that

this complicated protectionist structure could be simplified,
streamlined and reduced, but how far to go and how quickly
are the questions that are very controversial.

The IMF/WB

policies require a swift and severe approach to reduce trade
restrictions.
Fanelli et al. suggest that the problem with the IMF/WB
paradigm is the set of underlying assumptions.

For instance,

consider the belief that the free-market will alleviate
market distortions and inefficiencies.

As Fanelli describes

it, uTheir deficiencies lie in the incompatibilities between
their underlying assumptions and the world as it really
functions" (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 22).

In the real world

the free-market can lead to distortions such as transnational corporations, local monopolies, and the divide-andrule tactics of the domestic entrepreneurs that take severe
advantages of labor (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 22).
Also the IMF/WB's empirical basis relies on models with
assumptions of full employment and investment determined by
savings (Taylor, 1994, p. 66).

When protectionism is placed

into an investment-driven growth model, it can be easily lead
to faster overall expansion (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 22).
Obviously protectionism can be effectively utilized, which is
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more than can be said for the orthodox reforms demonstrated
in Argentina in the late 1970s.

The IMF/WB got their signals

wrong, and their reforms led to aborted economic growth for
at least a decade (Taylor, p. 66).
Economist David Evans uses Chile as an example of
effective protectionism.

The governments protection of the

fruit, forestry, and fishing industries led to an economic
export boom in 1985 (Evans, 1991, p. 10).

This was done in

part through governmental support of technological
investments, financial support through subsidized loans, and
through informational/educational means.

This was a relief

after 12 years of disastrous stabilization supported by the
IMF/WB (Evans, 1991, p. 12).
Although there have been protectionist failures too, the
point is that there should be debate over the issue for each
individual country, because it is not such a cut and dry
situation as the IMF/WB lays out.

One of the key intents of

a liberalized market is to increase technical efficiency.
Rodrick suggests that if "truth in advertising were to apply
to policy advice, each prescription for trade liberalization
would be accompanied with a disclaimer:

warning!

Trade

liberalization cannot be shown to enhance technical
efficiency; nor has it been empirically demonstrated to do
so" (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 23).
Another reform in the IMF/WB philosophy is financial
reform.

The basic strategy is to increase interest rates and
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deregulate the financial system which would in turn increase
allocative efficiency (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 23).
"Just as price liberalization does not ensure that firms will
efficiently produce commodities there is no particular reason
to expect that removing wedges separating rates of return
will guarantee a low-cost supply of financial services"
(Fanelli et al., p. 23).

At times, when applied, this

financial reform leads to reduced efficiency in finance,
which lead to increased credit costs (Fanelli et al.,
p. 23).

This is true in part because the IMF/WB method of

removal of state interventions/distortions at times leads to
market distortions such as monopolies and oligopolies which
have great power in the control of credit.

Because of the

lack of competition the financial institutions take advantage
of their market power and charge excessive rates.

Also, a

rise in interest rates may lead to a decrease in domestic
investments and capital improvements, thus contracting the
economy.
In addition, the policy of financial reform becomes
difficult in the context of other loan restrictions.

"Reform

of the financial sector often calls for distressed financial
institutions to be restructured;

in the short-run this may

raise public spending and make it harder to cut the budget
deficit" (World Bank, 1991, p. 115).
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Chapter

2:

Was there a Misdiagnosis of the Problems

in the Third

World and Were the Rew Adjustment Procedures
the

wrong

Prescription?

During the late 1970s and early 1980s many countries of
the underdeveloped world began to experience significant
difficulties.

They began to have serious debt burdens,

declining levels of export earnings, increasing fiscal
deficits, increased levels of inflation, increasing levels of
unemployment, as well as slower economic growth.

Why were

these countries having such great difficulties?
The IMF's economists have blamed the governments for all
of the problems experienced by Latin America in the pre-1982
period (Pastor, 1993, p. 291).

They point to restrictive

trade practices, price supports, fiscal expansion and
exchange rate overvaluation (Pastor, p. 291).

As discussed

in Chapter 1 the WB describes it as a high level of
"inefficiency" or in other words it was due to an increased
level of ''market distortions."
It is true that the governmental policies and their
management are partly to blame for these problems.

But to

point to governmental management of the economy (as indicated
by the IMF/WB philosophy) as the sole reason for the
difficulties is just not realistic.

Other factors on the

international economic scene during this time period had
their effects.

Is it possible that exogenous factors such as
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severe amounts of Third World debt accumulation, a world-wide
recession, two severe oil shocks, an overall drop in
agricultural commodity prices had an effect on these Third
World countries?

My answer is yes.

These external factors

did play a major role in the problems associated with the
underdeveloped world.
The IMF/WB's view was that the difficulties in the
"South" were internal and that serious adjustment needed to
be made.

Structural adjustment was introduced in

1980 by Robert

s. McNamara, formally the U.S. Secretary of

Defense, and then the President of the World Bank (George and
Sabelli, 1994, p. 58).

This structural adjustment (SAP)

would become a requirement if a country wished to receive
financial assistance from either the World Bank or the IMF
(George and Sebelli, p. 58).

Also the power of the IMF and

the WB wield is evidented from the fact that if these
countries refused to accept this SAP, other private financial
institutions would likewise generally refuse to loan funds to
these countries.

In order to deal with an increasing debt

burden, many countries were left without an alternative.
One of the obvious exogenous factors that should be
considered, is the debt crisis of the Third World.

The

growing debt crisis surfaced visibly and unavoidably in 1982,
when Mexico threatened default on their debt (Walton and
Seddon, 1994, p. 15).

As Table 2.1 indicates, non-oil

exporting developing countries began accumulating large
amounts of debt by the late 1970s and the early 1980s.

Total
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external debt increased nearly five fold between 1973 and
1982 (Cline, 1984, p. 1).

When adjusted for inflation, the

total debt does not look as severe, but none the less there
is a 210% increase in total debt over this time period
(Cline, p. 1).

Table 2.1
Indicators of External Debt of Non-oil Exporting Developing
Countries 1973-1982 (Billions of Dollars>
1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

Total('75 prices)

130.1
118.8
169.0

160.8
138.1
175.7

190.8
163.5
190.8

228.0
194.9
218.0

278.5
235.9
250.9

336.3
286.6
281.0

396.9
338.1
294.7

474.0
388.5
308.6

550.0
452.8
331.3

612.4
499.6
357.8

Excorts
Debt/Exports ( %)

112.7
115.4

153. 7
104.6

155.9
122.4

181. 7
125.5

220.3
126.4

258.3
130.2

333.0
119.2

419.8
121.9

444.4
124.9

427.4
143.3

15.9
N/A

14.4
-1.6

16.1
6.5

15.3
10.5

15.4
9.4

19.0
11.0

19.0
6.9

17.6
4.9

20.4
11. 7

23.9
22.3

22.4
5.9

21.8
12.6

23.8
13.3

25.7
15.6

27.4
15.1

28.5
13.9

27.5
16.2

27.6
20.4

31.0
21.0

34.7
19.9

Exte:rnal debt:
Total
Loner Term

Debt service/
excorts (%)
ReDOrted
Adiusted

Debt/GDP (%)
Oil as a % of
imcorts

Note.

From Cline, 1984, p. 2-3.

services only.

Exports were goods and

Debt service figures include interest but not

amortization on short term debt.

The adjusted figures for

debt service as a percentage of exports subtracted the
inflationary erosion of debt.

One could point to the fact that export earnings have
also increased four fold over this time period.

But, this is

less convincing when debt-service burden as opposed to debt
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itself is calculated (Cline, 1984, p. 2).

The debt service

burden became a problem primarily because of rising interest
rates.

Debt service (interest on short and long term debt

plus amortization on long term debt) rose from 15.9% of
exports of goods and services in 1973 to 24% in 1982 (Cline,
1984, p. 3).
The overall trend in Table 2.1 shows that while the
increase in debt burden is not as severe when measured in the
real terms relative to the export base (Cline, 1984, p. 4).
But, by 1981 the burden of debt rose significantly according
to three principle measures:

Ratio of debt to exports, real

(adjusted) debt service ratios, and ratio of debt to GDP
(Cline, p. 4).

In the following year 1982, these burdens

rose even further to levels never experienced before (Cline,
p. 4).

Despite these warning signs, the massive accumulation

of debt in the Third World continued during the 1980s.
The problem is seen more clearly when the countries
involved in the debt crisis are broken down into income
categories.

Middle income countries as a whole increased

their debt to GDP ratio from 36.1% in 1980 to 46.1% in 1989.
Lower-middle income countries increased their debt to GDP
ratio from 37.7% to 67.7% (Walton and Seddon, 1994, p. 15).
However, the most shocking figures are seen in the lowerincome category (other than India and China).

These

countries increased their ratio from 27.0% in 1980 to 71.0%
in 1989 (Walton and Seddon, p. 16).
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A primary cause of the sharp deterioration in growth in
1982 was a decline in the nominal value (by 3.8%) of exports
even as total debt continued to rise (10.3%) (Cline, 1984, p.
5).

Export stagnation was driven by three factors:

A global

recession (which caused export volume growth to decline), by
appreciation of the U.S. dollar (which lowers the dollar
value of export earnings), and by commodity price erosion
(Cline, p. 5).

As Table 2.1 illustrates, the issues

surrounding debt burdens played an important role in plunging
non-oil exporting countries further into trouble.

A closer

look at some selected countries up shows it played a much
larger role.

In Table 2.2 export growth of goods and

services is compared to the LIBOR + 1%.

The LIBOR (London

Interbank Offer Rate) is an international interest rate which
many international loans including many IMF/WB loans are set.
For the most of 1973-80 period, the LIBOR + 1% averaged
10.2%, while export growth averaged 21.1% (Cline, 1984, p.
8).

This growth in exports was obviously covering the

average interest rate of 10.2% the country's were paying.
The interest rate was being clearly met and overfulfilled.
As the table indicates the first incident occurred in
1975.

Countries that were experiencing prosperous export

activity (Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, and Mexico) were
plunged into severe export difficulties.

The 1975 downturn

would turn out to be quite deep, and at the time was the most
severe economic downturn since the Great Depression (Cooper,
1992, p. 2).

The market eventually recover by the year 1978.
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Table 2.2
Export Growth Compared With Interest Rates,
1973-1982

(Export Growth is in a Percentage Form>

LIBOR + 1 oercent

1973
10.2

1974
12.0

1975
8.0

1976
6.6

1977
7.0

1978
9.7

1979
13.0

1980
15.4

1981
17.5

1982
14 .1

Export growth,
nominal
non-oil LDC's
net oil imcorters
net oil exporters

N/A.
N/A.
N/A.

36.4
33.1
57.3

1.4
1.6
-0.1

16.5
16.3
18.9

21.2
21.9
18.8

17.2
16.9
18.0

28.9
26.8
40.4

26.1
24.2
35.4

5.8
5.4
7.8

-3.8
-3.8
-3.6

Brazil
Mexico
Argentina
Korea
Venezuela
Chile

56.1
26.8
61.6
85.6
54.4
49.0

33.2
31.6
25.8
29.4
126.8
60.1

6.1
-0.2
-23.9
9.7
-15.7
-21. 7

13.5
13.3
30.8
60.8
2.8
31. 7

19.7
14.0
43.6
38.2
5.5
8.1

7.2
39.1
16.3
31.3
-0.8
13.8

24.2
40.2
26.6
13.8
50.2
59.0

29.3
54.3
13.0
15.6
36.4
32.2

15. 7
21.9
5.1
21. 7
10.1
-2.6

-13.4
7.3
-15.7
2.3
-22.0
-3.8

Note.

From Cline, 1984, p. 6-7.

Exports were goods and

services only.

But the problems of the downturn were not as severe as
the one that occurred in 1981-1982.

"The difference between

the interest and export-growth was smaller (6.6% in 1975
compared with an average of 14.8% in 1981-82), reflecting
that the 1975 recession was shorter and less severe.
Moreover, the relative severity of the debt burden was milder
going into the 1975 recession (as measured by debt relative
to exports and GDP, and the debt service ratio, Table 2.1)"
(Cline, 1984, p. 8).
The world recession in 1981-1982 period was in many
respects more severe than the one experienced six years
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before (Cooper, 1992, p. 4).

This was due to the extremely

high interest rates in the early 1980s, which can be seen by
the movement of the LIBOR during this time period.
Overall, the relative debt burden sharpened severely in
the 1981-82 period, in addition to the milder recession of
1975 (Cline, 1984, p. 8).

The debt problems experienced were

also affected by endogenous factors, such as:

Interest rate

decisions, domestic budgetary policies, governmental
inefficiencies, and corruption.

But it is quite clear that

exogenous variables played a powerful role in accelerating
the debt burdens.
Another one of the exogenous factors that led to
difficulties for these developing countries was the two oil
shocks.

This had the most powerful negative effect on their

debt difficulties.
In December of 1973 the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) ministers increased the market
price of oil from $3.60 per barrel to $11.65 per barrel (a
three fold increase) (Cooper, 1992, p. 1).
only $1.35 per barrel (Cooper, p. 1).

In 1970 oil was

This began the first

episode of international financial instability.

This

occurred at a time when the demand for oil was quite high
because the world economic growth up to the 1972-73 period
was quite rapid, as compared to post-1973.

From 1968 to 1973

the quantity of oil demanded increased from 19 million
barrels per day to 30 million barrels per day (Cooper, p. 2).
This was the largest per unit oil-shock ever experienced.
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Cooper argues that we are still feeling the effects of the
first oil shock today, in the form of accumulated debt and
the memories of the subsequent turbulence (Cooper, p. 2).
These effects will continue to affect policies for years to
come (Cooper, p. 1).
World oil markets had become relatively calm by mid1978, and oil prices had actually declined somewhat in real
terms from 1974.

Then turmoil developed in Iran.

Oil field

workers went on strike in December of 1978, which caused
about five billion barrels of crude per day to be removed
from the market (Cooper, 1992, p. 21).

Oil workers

eventually returned to work but production levels would never
be as high as they were before.

Subsequently, other

producers reacted and oil prices rose again.

At that time,

there was great disagreement in the OPEC community about
production levels and prices.
reached $33 per barrel.

By March of 1981 prices

This was an increase of 150% over

two years.
Needless to say oil importing countries found themselves
in great difficulties, much like they had experienced in the
first shock.

But, this time there were additional factors

that made the situation much worse, including higher real
interest rates.

At the time, a great portion of their

overall debt was maintained at market rates, rates that were
unusually high.

Their debt was usually pegged to the LIBOR

(two-thirds of the Third world debt was pegged to the LIBOR)
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or the U.S. prime rate (Cooper, 1992, p. 22).

The LIBOR

averaged 17.5% in 1981.
Oil importing countries had some decisions to make.
They had to decide how much to contract imports and how much
to borrow to cover the additional import bill (Cooper, 1992,
p. 22).

In most cases, these oil importing countries found

themselves in severe debt difficulty.

Because of the

instability in their respective countries and also the world
wide recession, few private banks or institutions were
willing to loan funds.

These countries were forced to deal

with the IMF/WB to get the necessary funds to cover their
debts.
The effect of relatively high oil prices and interest
rates can also be seen by the value of oil imports to these
Third World nations.

As Table 2.1 indicates the value of oil

imports rose from 6% of total merchandise imports in 1973 to
20% in 1980-82 (Cline, 1984, p. 8).
Table 2.3 shows the cumulative additional costs of oil
imports on the oil importing developing countries (Cline,
1984, p. 10).

The second column shows actual net oil imports

of these countries over the ten year time period, 1973-82.
The third column shows the price that they would have paid if
oil would not have risen more than the U.S. wholesale price
index after 1973 (Cline, p. 10).

As you can see by the

table, the cumulative additional costs were $260 billion over
the decade.
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Table 2.3
Effect of Higher Oil Prices on Debt of Non-oil Developing
Countries <Net Oil Importers Only> in Billions of Dollars
Year
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Total: 1974-1982

Note.

Oil Imports
Actual (A)
4.8
16.1
17.3
21.3
23.8
26.0
39.0
63.2
66.7
66.7
344.9

Oil Imports
Hypothetical CB)
4.8
5.3
5.7
6.8
7.5
8.6
10.9
11.9
12.1
11.9
85.5

Additional Cost
(C = A - B)
0.0
10.8
11.6
14.5
16.3
17.4
28.1
51.3
54.6
54.8
259.5

From Cline, 1984, p. 10. Column B is based on the

assumption that oil prices did not rise any more that U.S.
wholesale prices.

If we accept Cline's figures, then we have to recognize
that oil-price increases alone accounted for over a fourth of
the debt incurred by the Third World countries (George, 1988,
p. 24)

Obviously the effect was greater on the non-oil

countries.

Those outside the charmed circle of oil producers had no
choice in the matter:

Either they increased borrowing

or they allowed their energy starved economies to come
to a screeching halt.

L

The option of paying for oil by
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dramatically increasing their own exports was not open
to them (George, p. 29).

It is not entirely clear what the total effect of the
oil shocks was on the developing countries' debt burden or
the overall economic standing of the country.

What is clear

is that the effect was significantly negative, and these
shocks should have been considered before the IMF/WB
structural reforms were imposed.
Two

additional factors that were important in

contributing to the crisis were the rise in interest rates
and a world wide recession in the 1980-82 period.

Borrowers

had become adjusted to low real interest rates in the mid to
late 1970s.

Normally, interest rates are tied to inflation.

They tended to rise and fall together (George, 1988, p. 28).
But in the mid to late 1970s, interest rates did not rise as
much as inflation, thus making the real rate negative
(George, p. 28).

In some years interest rates were as low as

-3% to -4% in real terms (George, p. 28).
But the rub was that in the 1980s interest rates didn't
fall as much as inflation leaving debtors holding the bag
(George, 1988, p. 28).

Every additional point increase in

the real interest rate caused the country to incur extra
billions in debt service (anywhere from $2 billion to $6
billion per point according to varied estimates) thus forcing
these countries to get new loans to pay for their interest
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payments (George, p. 28).

It is easy to see why the

indebtedness of these countries began to grow quickly.
Coincidentally with the relatively higher interest
rates, the international economy experienced a severe
recession in 1980-82 (Cline, 1984, p. 12).

uFrom 1973 to

1979 real growth in industrial countries averaged 3.2%
annually.

It fell to 1.2% in 1980-81 and -0.3% in 1982"

(Cline, p. 12).

As a result of the slowdown, the developing

countries experienced a drop in the prices of their primary
exports.

uwith 1980

= 100,

export unit values fell to an

index of 94 in 1981 and 90 for 1982 in non-oil developing
countries" (Cline, p. 12).

The resulting effect was a loss

of $25 billion in export unit values and an import cost
increase of $9.6 billion in 1981, and a loss of export unit
value in 1982 of $44 billion, with no increase in 1982 import
costs (Cline, p. 13).

Cline then calculated the total loss

to non-oil developing countries due to deteriorated terms of
trade, for 1981-82 he estimated this loss to be $79 billion
(Cline, p. 13).
In addition, real export volumes (with constant prices)
from developing countries fell as a result of the
international recession.

On average real export volume

growth for non-oil developing countries averaged 8.1% from
1971-80, rose to 9.9% in 1981, and in 1982 fell to 1.8%
(Cline, 1984, p. 13).

This implies a net loss of $21 billion

from the trend in real exports (with no price changes), given
the average shortfall for the two years (Cline, p. 13).
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As shown in Table 2.4 the combined effect of these
exogenous factors (on an ex ante, or potential basis) was to
increase the debt of non-oil developing countries by $401
billion over the 1973 to 1982 time period (Cline, 1984,
p. 13). Table 2.4 shows the actual increases in debt over the
time periods in question.

Table 2.4
Effects of Exogenous Shocks on External Debt on Non-oil
Developing Countries
Effect
Oil Prices increase in excess of U.S. inflation, 1974-82 cumulative
Real interest rate in excess of 1961-80 average: 1981 and 1982
Te:cns-of-Trade loss, 1981-82
Export volmne loss caused by world recession, 1981-82
Total

I

Memorandum Items
Total Debt: 1973
1982
Increase:

Note.

1973

-

$130
$612
$482

1982

From Cline, 1984, p. 13.

Amount
$260
$41
$79
$21
$401

Net oil importers only.

Although these numbers can not be directly identified
with actual increases in debt (because countries did pursue
adjustment measures to reduce external deficits and debt from
levels they would otherwise would have reached) these figures
do however show the exogenous factors of two oil shocks,
abnormally high interest rates, declines in the terms of
trade for these developing countries, and falling export
volume associated with the global recession did play a
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dominant role in the debt crisis of non-oil exporting
developing countries.
What about the oil exporters such as Mexico, Venezuela,
and Nigeria?

Didn't they profit from these high prices and

enjoy lower debts than they would otherwise would have
incurred (George, 1988, p. 29).

Didn't relatively higher

revenues from oil exports, at least help to prevent the $260
billion debt increase from growing even more (George, p. 29)?
According to Susan George, probably not.

First,

countries like Mexico borrowed heavily in order to develop
their oil industry (George, 1988, p. 29).

PEMEX, the Mexican

state oil corporation had to borrow $20 billion in 1982 (onefourth of the Mexican debt) just to keep its program running
(George, p. 29).

Second, the more oil a country had, the

more banks were anxious to push their money at it, confident
in the belief that oil reserves would ensure repayment.
uwithout black gold in the ground Nigeria, for one, wouldn't
have looked much like a good credit risku (George, p. 29).
After the calamities (e.g.:

the severe debt

accumulation, etc.) the IMF/WB started new adjustment
programs for these countries.

The IMF/WB attributed

difficulties to serious internal distortions.

In the eyes of

the IMF/WB, the only reasonable solution was to alter the
economic atmosphere of these developing countries.

They

sought to make the market free of inefficiencies.
Were the behaviors of these countries the cause of their
difficulties in the early 1980s?

As the data shows, these
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countries were making great strides in export production
during the 1970s.

They were converting their economies from

the WB/IMF's opinion of a "bad" or ineffective development
strategy, namely import-substituting industrialization (ISI)
to export-led industrialization (ELI).
It is difficult to blame these economies' problems on
some product protection, import quotas, or price
controls/subsidies.

In many cases, these countries needed to

protect their inf ant industries against "dumping" and other
untoward practices of the multi-national corporations.
Opening an economy entirely up to the market can be deadly,
discussed in Chapter 3 in my country analysis section.
The IMF/WB got the issues wrong.

Exogenous factors

played a serious role in determining the development process
of the developing countries.

Internal policies needed to be

analyzed and perhaps altered in many cases.

But to blame

internal policies for all of the difficulties that the
underdeveloped nations faced in early 1980s is not realistic,
and led to counter productive "adjustment" programs.
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Chapter

3:

Country Analysis of Chile and Mexico After the
Implementation

of

IMF /WB

Programs.

During the 1970s, international lending by banks and
multi-lateral agencies increased twelve fold (Walton and
Seddon, 1994, p. 98).

Latin America and the Caribbean

absorbed nearly one-half of the borrowed funds (Walton and
Seddon, p. 98).

Countries in Latin America, namely

Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have consistently been among
the world's largest debtor countries ranked by the absolute
size of their external obligations.
Despite the IMF/WB's opinion that the problems of Latin
American countries were attributable to unrelated "poor"
policies in individual countries, the IMF recommended
virtually the same reforms to all of Latin America:
Devaluation, reduction in fiscal deficits, and the reduction
in real wages (usually done by freezing nominal public sector
wages -- and therefore indirectly public sector real wages)
(Pastor, 1993, p. 297).

"In addition the Fund argued for the

relaxation of controls on trade and capital flows in the
international sphere, as well as the elimination of subsidies
and other interference" (Pastor, p. 297).
Indeed the only price the IMF wished to be regulated was
the price of labor. Unfortunately, these wage reductions
yielded little export advantage because developed countries
were stagnant, and because every other developing country was
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practicing the same policies (Pastor, p. 297).

A reason

behind this wage suppression was to inhibit excess aggregate
demand.

But this would not be necessary when domestic

consumption was already contractionary due to a collapsing
export market (due to other countries also increasing export
levels as well as the economic slowdown in the "North")
(Pastor, p. 298).
All of these measures were done to remove any
"distortions," in order to allow the market to alleviate any
economic difficulties.

It seems that the IMF/WB are placing

a lot of faith in the "magic of the market."

Chile
Chile is perhaps the country with the longest running
SAP in the world (Bello, 1994, p. 42).

This SAP was placed

into a society which at the time was characterized as
implementing heavy interventionist policies (Bello, p. 42).
The program took on the characteristics of a typical
structural adjustment and stabilization program, including:
financial liberalization, monetary devaluation, export
oriented industrialization, privatization, and

deregulation

(Solimeno, 1994, p. 130).
Prior to the stabilization and structural adjustment
procedures, Chile succeeded in modernizing its institutions,
fostering social mobility, and brought about economic
progress (Ffrench-Davis and Munoz, 1994, p. 281).

It was
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also known for having one of the most equal income
distributions in Latin America.
Previous presidents of Chile embraced the idea of a
mixed economy.

This means an active state which promotes

private investment and ensures the social well-being of the
lower and middle classes (Ffrench-Davis and Munoz, 1994, p.
281).

However, when General Pinochet overthrew the

democratically elected government of Chile in 1973, he
embraced the free-market and monetarist ideologies (FfrenchDavis and Munoz, p. 280).

He soon began a transformation of

the Chilean economy with the help of the World Bank and the
IMF.

His idea was to make the economy more laissez-faire

(with the exception of a 1982-5 bailout when the state came
to the aid of a bankrupt financial sector) and more open to
the international community (Ffrench-Davis and Munoz, p.
281).
By the end of the 1980s the Chilean economy had indeed
gone through a transformation.

Some six-hundred state

enterprises had been sold off with fewer than 50 remaining in
domestic hands (Bello, 1994, p. 42).

By the end of the

"adjustment" procedure, Chile was transformed into one on the
most "free market" countries in the Third World (Bello, p.
42).

Foreign investors saw an opportunity to take large

portions of the former state enterprises.

They took control

over key industries such as telecommunications, airlines, and
steel production (Solimeno, 1994, p. 130).
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Unfortunately, this privatization mainly favored the upper
class.

Pinochet sold off these enterprises at "slashed"

prices to his "Chicago boy" clients (Taylor, 1994, p. 49).
Also, the economy indeed became more integrated into the
international economy.

In 1970, 35% of the nation's GDP was

comprised of export earnings (Bello, 1994, p. 42).

By 1990,

the figure had risen to 57% (Bello, p. 42).
This new export-led industrialization (ELI) strategy by
definition encouraged the export of their goods in which they
had a comparative advantage:

Natural resources.

This was in

contrast to Chile's previous development strategy ISI, which
favored manufacturing sectors such as metal working and other
related enterprises.

As seen in Table 3.1 the manufacturing

sector decreased from 26% in the 1960s, to 20% in the 1980s
(Ffrench-Davis and Munoz, 1994, p. 287).
Did this transformation help the economy?

Many have

reported the Chilean experiment in structural adjustment a
great success.

The Chilean economy saw a rapid rise in

exports, a positive trade balance, increased foreign
investment, and a relatively low inflation rate
(International NGO, 1994, p. 51).

With the growing export

sector of the economy (as shown in Table 3.1), Chile has been
cited as "South America's tiger," a comparison with Korea and
Taiwan (International NGO, p. 51).

These have been

guideposts in determining the success of a structural
adjustment program.

But a closer look at the numbers leads

me to a different conclusion.
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Table 3.1
Growth Rates and GDP shares of Manufacturing, Exports
and Agriculture in Chile
Annual Growth Rates
Period

Manufacturing

Agriculture

Exports of Goods
and Services

1950-61

4.8

1.8

2.6

1961-71

6.0

2.9

3.2

1971-74

-1.6

-1.8

8.4

1974-81

-1.0

1.8

9.4

1981-89

2.6

3.1

7.3

GDP Shares
Period

Manufacturing

Agriculture

Exports of Goods
and Services

1950-61

22.2

11.8

12.3

1961-71

25.4

9.6

12.0

1971-74

27.2

8.3

9.9

1974-81

22.0

8.6

20.2

1981-89

19.3

8.8

28.1

Note.

Percentages based on 1977 prices. From R. Ffrench-

Davis and

o. Munoz, 1994, p. 287.

The Organization for European Cooperation and
Development (OECD) asserted that the costs of the Chilean SAP
were among the largest in Latin America (Solimono, 1994,
p. 131).
Others agree with the OECD.

Walden Bello suggests if we

were to gauge the success of the program by the economic
growth rates it would be deemed a failure.

The growth rate

during the 1974-89 period (after the installment of the
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adjustment program) averaged only 2.6% per year, which was
much worse than the growth rates experienced under the ISI
period (Bello, 1994, p. 43).

Those growth rates were:

4%

per year in 1950-61 period and 4.6% per year in the 1961-71
period (Bello, p. 43).
The detrimental effect on the growth rate was not the
only negative effect on the Chilean economy.

"The

combination of a lower rate of investment and the draconian
trade liberalization resulted in de-industrialization:

The

manufacturing sector lost ground, declining from an average
of 26% in GDP in the late 1960s to an average of 20% in the
late 1980s" (Bello, 1994, p. 44).

Since then he

manufacturing sector has failed to reach its previous levels.
It was not until 1988 that the industrial value-added
surpassed the absolute level attained in 1974 (Solimeno,
1994, p. 130).
Even though the Chilean economy showed a more consistent
growth pattern through the mid to late 1980s, few benefited.
The philosophy behind the program was that the "free market"
would inspire entrepreneurship, and this would foster growth
which would trickle-down to the people of the lower economic
strata (International NGO, 1994, p. 51).

Despite their

beliefs, these economic "improvements" have primarily been
enjoyed by the economic elite (International NGO, p. 51).
The gap between the rich and the poor sectors was amplified.
This was done in part through a cutback in government
spending (24% of government expenditures were cut), a tough
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freeze on wages, and a massive devaluation of the Chilean
peso (Bello, 1994, p. 44).
This gap between the rich and the poor is seen through
the increase in the proportion of families living below the
line of destitution (Bello, 1994, p. 44).
from 12% to 15% (Bello, p. 44).

This figure rose

Also the number of people

living above the line of destitution but below the poverty
line increased from 24% to 26% (Bello, p. 44).

By the

beginning of the 1990s, 41% (26% plus 15%) of the population
were living below the poverty line.
Also during this time period, income distribution became
even more skewed.

The income share of the poorest 50%

declined from 20.4% to 16.8%, and while the share going to
the richest 10% went up from 36.5% to 46.8% (Bello, 1994, p.
45).
These adjustments have caused Chile to fall deeper into
the "debt trap."

Chile's external debt of

US$ 19 billion was higher than it had been at the start of
the debt crisis in 1982 (Bello, 1994, p. 42).

Total debt

stood at 49% of GNP in 1991 and at the time 9% of GNP was
flowing out of the country to service the debt (Bello,
p. 42).

In addition to the working class, the environment was
also taking a hit.
dramatic.

The effects on the environment have been

"The economic growth of Chile has taken place at

the expense of the environment •••

The so called export boom

was based on the use and abuse of natural resources,
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permitting the degradation

of the eco-system greater than

their ability to regenerate" (Spalding, 1992, p. 49).

Mexico
Mexico is another country that has been touted as the,
"vanguard of structural reform in Latin America" (Bello,
1994, p. 37).

But, as is the case with other Latin American

countries another conclusion might be drawn from the data.
The Mexican government agreed to an SAP in 1983 after
the full effects were known about Mexico's debt difficulties.
A seven year plan was developed and was supposed to provide
sustained growth through the reduction of state
interventions, otherwise known as "market distortions," as
well as to stabilize the economy.

The Mexican difficulties

was blamed (by the IMF and WB) on a "bad" development
strategy that the Mexican government had pursued in the past
(Ros and Lustig, 1994, p. 273).

As Table 3.2 shows, this

opinion is difficult to prove when looking at real GDP growth
rates.
It was believed that price and financial stability would
be gained through drastic and permanent cuts in government
spending, as well as a currency devaluation against hard
currencies (Ros and Lustig, 1994, p. 273).
Has the SAP been sufficient in delivering debt relief to
the Mexican economy?

Even as late as the 1989 debt reduction

agreement and the agreement reached in early 1995, there was
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only a rescheduling of debt program rather than actual debt
reduction.
In 1989, the IMF and the U.S. wanted Mexico to reduce
their debt to the

u.s. by US$7 billion (Bello, 1994, p. 37).

But, during the loan process, Mexico had to borrow another
US$7 billion to collateralize the debt fully (Bello, p. 37).
What Mexico ended up with was a 30 year rescheduling of their
old debt and their new debt.
Two

years later the Mexican debt was US$98 billion which

was US$3 billion more than the figure in 1989 (Bello, 1994,
p. 37).
occurred;

However, as a percentage of GDP, a mild reduction
a decrease from 53% in 1989 to 48% in 1991 (Bello,

p. 38).
In addition, Mexico was also one of the first countries
to undergo the privatization program under the WB guidelines.
These efforts, by some accounts, have failed.

Instead of

improving efficiency, re-distributing wealth and breaking up
monopolies, many distortions were transferred to the elite,
instead of actually eliminating the distortions.

Carlos

Heredia, an ex-deputy director of Mexico's Ministry of
Finance, stated that uMexican privatization basically
transformed public monopolies into private ones" (Avery,
1994, p. 97).
Heredia further asserts that, uprivatization has
worsened the already steep concentration of wealth in the
country.

Along with structural adjustment policies in

general, privatization has benefited the friends of President
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Carlos Salinas." (Avery, 1994, p. 97)

The privatization

efforts were supposed to improve the fiscal standing of the
government, demonstrate the government's commitment to the
private sector, improve efficiency of entrepreneurs,
eliminate

monopolies, and add to the quality of the private

sector (Avery, p. 97).

According to Heredia, the government

has achieved the first two objectives but has forgotten the
rest (Avery, p. 97).
For example, the Mexican telephone company (Telmex), was
a government organization which was sold to a private
entrepreneur Carlos Slim (Avery, 1994, p. 98).
close personal ally of President Salinas.

Slim was a

Herendia says the

transfer, "illustrates how the Mexican privatization has
benefited a few private capitalists at the expense of
consumers" (Avery, p. 98).

Also reportedly the industry has

not improved efficiency either.

The telephone rates have

skyrocketed and also much needed improvements in the system
have not been made (Avery, p. 98).
But have these reforms at least helped the country?
Probably not.

As Table 3.2 indicates, the country has failed

to achieve the growth rates they had achieved under an ISI
development strategy.

The period following the SAPs has been

characterized as an era of stagnation and declining
standards of living.

Also, fixed investment declined from

21% of GDP in the 1970-1981 period to 18% in the 1982-1985
period (Lustig, 1992, p. 234).
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Table 3.2
Growth Rates of Real Gross Domestic Product in Mexico,
Selected Years, 1965 to 1993

Note.

Year{s}
1965-1980

Growth Rate

1980-1986
1987

0.4
1.9

1988

1.2

1989

3.3

1990

4.4

1991

3.6

1992

2.7

1993

0.4

6.5 %

From R.A. Blecker, 1995, p. 8. Figures were from World

Development Report 1965-1986;

for 1987-1993 calculated from

IMF's International Financial Statistics.

The failure of the SAP to stabilize the Mexican economy
is known since the financial crisis that ensued from the 1995
collapse of the peso has already caused a sharp reduction in
real wages as well as environmental difficulties

(e.g.:

deforestation, water pollution, and air pollution).
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Chapter

4:

Conclusions

After the implementation of the structural adjustment
programs in the early 1980s, few countries have prospered.
As in the cases of the Latin American countries discussed
above, income distributions have worsened, inflation has not
been curtailed, real wages have fallen, and balance of
payment difficulties have in many cases not improved.
The facts do not support the opinion of the world Bank
and the International Monetary Fund, that all of the
difficulties the underdeveloped world experienced were due to
endogenous factors such as "bad" development strategies and
improper governmental operations.
In addition, the policies that the IMF and the WB lays
out are flawed in their reasoning.

As discussed in

Chapter 1, these policies are not equipped fundamentally to
deal with the problems they set out to solve.

It seems that

the main concern of the IMF/WB is to ensure that these
countries are "corrected" is such a way that they are at
least able to pay their loan payment, and are vulnerable in
such a way that their resources can be extracted to benefit
the North as well as their multi-national corporations.

This

is in contrast to what should be their true goal, of actually
alleviating the difficulties that these countries face.
The IMF and the World Bank need to seriously reevaluate
the soundness of their policies.

They also need to get other

non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who deal directly with
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these underdeveloped nations and who know full well what
their difficulties, the NGOs also need to be fully involved
in the development of a more reasonable set of guidelines.
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Appendix

Table A.1

Socio-economic indicators for major Latin
American Countries

Table A.2

Socio-economic indicators for major Latin
American Countries (continued)

Table A.3

Latin America Under the IMF:
Key Economic Variables

Behavior of Certain
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Boliva
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Costa Rica
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El Salvador
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Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
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Trinidad/Tobago
Uruguay
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1990

1,529
64
622
1,075
437
1,308
466
926
326
245
108
570
1,467
970
1,873
1,576
523
603
1,431
953
1,352

Total External
Public Debt $
per capita
7988

88
232
110
162
127
48
75
75
34
330
174
45
28
109
67
49
125
69
29
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26
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743
320
240
179
241
165
379
172
200
156
270
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278
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63
2, 133
348
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184
197
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249
88,733
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480

**

63,930
675
87,722
242
305
219
426
658
288
190
116
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185
1,405
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Public Debt to export
earnings(%)
Price Index
7970
1987
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Table A.1: Socio-economic indicators for major Latin American countries

1965

86
51
77
86
70
54
60
57
44
42
30
44
52
73
60
55
47
70
69
83
90

Percent Urban

1990 (x7000)

76
40
50
72
54
38
35
37
39
34
18
26
38
55
43
44
36
52
30
81
70

Population

32,322
7,313
150,368
13, 174
31,819
3,015
7, 170
10, 781
5,252
9, 196
6,504
5, 139
2,521
88,598
33,871
2,418
4,277
22,332
1,283
3,218
19,735

Note: Taken from J. Walton & D. Seddon ( 19 94)
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9.3
20.3
4.2
10.1

1989

**

6.3
6.7
8.2

**

1972

**

2.0
6.6
6.1
5.9

1989

Earnings Per
Employee

1972

**

Earnings Per Employee
Average Growth

20.0
31.3
8.3
14.3

17.0

Health

1988

**

Education

1980-88

**

97
46
109
105
115

(1980= 100)

1970-80

**

1.4
-10.3
0.0
-1. 7
3.2
-4.4
-1.3
-9.3
-2.7
4.6

72
31
123

**
**

79
95
63
89
157

16.4
16.6
20.7
12.1
23.6

22.3

19.1
11.4
15.6

4.5
4.0
15.1
3.5
5.5

**

**

19.8
3.0
5.5

**
**
**
**
**
0.2

**

**

12.3

10.2

**

1.7

9.8
7.4

**
**

**

**

4.5
10.0

**

27.2

**

-1.5
0.0
4.0
8.1
-0.2

23.4
17.6

-5.2
-10.0
3.2

95

**

16
11. 7

**
**

**

**

79
19.6

**
**

-1.0
3.3
2.4
-3.2
-3.3

-3.0

**

9.5
18.6

**
**
**
**
3.8

**
**
**
**
**

**

118
98

-0.2
1.2

1.0
0.1

**

28.3
14.2
27.5
21.4

4.0
11. 7
1.5
10.9

(1980=100)

Table A.2: Socio-economic indicators for major Latin American Countries (Continued)

Argentina
Boliva
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Jamacia
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Trinidad/Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela

Note: Taken from J. Walton & D. Seddon ( 1994)
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GDP (median)
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Inflation rate
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Growth rate of
per capita RGDP

Growth rate of
real GDP (RGDP)

23.5

-2.6

-1.1

Average
1978-80

34.3

3.3

5.8

Average
1969-80

23.3

-5.3

-5.6

1981

60.7

-2.2

-0.2

1981

21.2

-5.4

-5.8

1982

67.1

-3.4

-1.1

1982

17.4

-4.9

-5.7

1983

108.7

-5.0

-2.8

1983

17.1

-4.7

-4.2

1984

133.5

1.4

3.7

1984

18.4

-3.2

-3.8

1985

145.1

1. 1

3.3

1985

18.1

-3.4

-5.0

1986

87.4

1.6

4.7

1986

19.8

-2.5

-6.6

1987

131.3

1.2

2.4

1987

20.3

-3.3

-5.3

1988

286.2

-1.9

0.2

1988

20.0

-2.9

-4.9

1989

533.4

-0.6

1.4

1989

18.4

-1.8

0.1

1990

769.8

-2.8

-0.9

1990

Table A.3: Latin America Under IMF -- Behavior of Certain Key Economic Variables

Gross capital
formation
as% of GDP

Notes: Taken from M. Pastor, 1993, p. 248.
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